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There’s no Such Thing as a Free Trade 
(Agreement): The Environmental Costs of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Paul Nuñez* 
The global community is quickly approaching the limits of 
the carbon budget meant to keep the effects of climate 
change below 2 degrees Celsius. Yet, the Countries involved 
in negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership only incremen-
tally strengthened the environmental protections contained 
within the agreement compared to other recent Free Trade 
Agreements. As with most Free Trade Agreements, the envi-
ronmental community fears that any beneficial effect from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s environmental provisions 
will be more than outweighed by its environmentally de-
structive consequences. The investor protection provisions 
are especially concerning to many environmental groups as 
these protections allow companies to sue governments to re-
coup losses resulting from certain regulations. Moreover, 
these suits are decided by non-governmental arbitration 
panels rather than by the court systems of member countries. 
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Negotiated at nearly the same time as a historic global cli-
mate change accord, and by an administration supportive of 
efforts to curb carbon dioxide emissions, does the Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership materially improve upon the mistakes of 
earlier agreements, or does the agreement have the potential 





Section I - Environmental Provisions ...................................235 
A. Breadth of Topics Covered, and their Binding, or 
Non-Binding Nature ...................................................237 
B. TPP’s Approach to Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements .................................................................240 
C. Enforcement of TPP’s Environmental Provisions ......243 
Section II - Investor Protection .............................................245 
A. Arbitral Interpretations of NAFTA’s Expropriation 
Provision .....................................................................246 
B. Post-NAFTA Evolution of FTA Expropriation 
Provisions ...................................................................256 
Section III – Potential Conflict Between Environmental 
Provisions and Investor Provisions .................................260 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................266 
 
From November 30th to December 11th, 2015, the UN held the 
21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“COP 21”).1 The de-
clared aim of COP 21 was for the global community to reach an 
accord that “will limit the rise in average global temperatures to 2 
degrees Celsius, compared to the pre-industrial period, by the end of 
the century.”2 Failure to meet this goal will likely have disastrous 
results. “[L]ong-term sea level rise may exceed 1 meter”; “the risks 
                                                                                                             
 1 UNFCCC COP 21, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sustainablede-
velopment/events/un-climate-change-conference/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 2 Laurent Fabius, Our Climate Imperatives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/opinion/laurent-fabius-our-climate-impera-
tives.html?_r=0. 
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of combined ocean warming and acidification would become high,” 
and there could be mass coral bleaching.3 “[C]rop production would 
be at high risk . . . .”4 Furthermore, “[t]he risks will be increasingly 
unevenly distributed, and are generally greater for disadvantaged 
people and communities in countries at all levels of develop-
ment . . . .”5 
The effects of our warming climate can already be felt. Of the 
fifteen warmest years on record, fourteen have occurred since 2000.6 
2014 was the second hottest year ever recorded before 2015 sur-
passed it by 0.23º F (0.13º C), the widest marginal temperature in-
crease ever recorded, to become the new hottest year recorded.7 Sig-
nificant reduction in worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases is 
needed in order to meet the 2 °C global goal.8 One hundred and sev-
enty countries submitted their proposed climate action plans to the 
United Nations ahead of the COP 21 meeting.9 An analysis of the 
plans submitted reveals that countries’ submissions are projected to 
fall short of meeting the 2 °C global warming target.10 Even if fully 
implemented, the proposed plans submitted ahead of COP 21 are 
                                                                                                             
 3 Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013-2015 review, UNITED 
NATIONS, 15 (May 4, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sb/eng/inf01.
pdf. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 16. 
 6 Damian Carrington, 14 of the 15 hottest years on record have occurred 
since 2000, UN says, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.co
m/environment/2015/feb/02/14-15-hottest-years-record-2000-un-global-warm-
ing. 
 7 Release 16-008, NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal Record-Shattering Global 
Warm Temperatures in 2015, NASA (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nasa.gov/press-
release/nasa-noaa-analyses-reveal-record-shattering-global-warm-temperatures-
in-2015. 
 8 The Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri et al., Climate Change 2014 
Synthesis Report INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 10 (2014), 
http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf. 
 9 What is the purpose of the national “contributions” (INDC)?, UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/what
-is-the-purpose-of-the-national-contributions-indc (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 10 See Effect of current pledges and policies on global temperature, CLIMATE 
ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/global.html (last visited Feb. 
19, 2016). 
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insufficient to keep warming below 2 °C, and if countries fail to ad-
equately implement their climate change regulations, warming 
could be even more severe.11 
One impediment to a stronger climate deal is the belief that 
greater environmental protection means slower economic growth.12 
The link between the economy and the environment is extremely 
complex. Economic growth often comes at the expense of environ-
mental health,13 but economic growth can also lead to greater de-
mand for action to protect the environment.14 Some have argued that 
faster economic growth is the key to ending the threat posed by cli-
mate change.15 At least one study, however, has found both “evi-
dence for the hypothesis that higher levels of economic growth are 
directly related to higher levels of supportiveness for environmental 
protection,” and that publics of nations with high levels of national 
wealth appear to be less willing to pay for environmental protection 
than the publics of countries with low levels of national wealth.16 
The claim that “increases in societal wealth correlate with increases 
in the demand for environmental quality” is further complicated by 
the fact that economic growth in richer countries often correlates to 
                                                                                                             
 11 Id. 
 12 Wynne Parry, Economic Decline Not Enough to Reduce Planet-Warming 
Emissions, LIVE SCIENCE (Oct. 7, 2012, 03:32 PM), http://www.livescience.com/
23781-economic-decline-global-warming-emissions.html. 
 13 See Jane A. Legget, Congressional Research Service, “China’s Green-
house Gas Emissions And Mitigation Policies” UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA (July 18, 2011), http://china.usc.edu/congressional-research-service-
china’s-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-mitigation-policies-july-18-2011. 
 14 See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles for Environmental Reform, 
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 253, 269 (2013), http://www.perc.org/sites/de-
fault/files/pdfs/Adler,%20Conservative%20Principles%20for%20Environmen-
tal%20Reform.pdf (“As a general rule, increases in societal wealth correlate with 
increases in the demand for environmental quality and in the means to protect 
environmental concerns.”). 
 15 E.g., Ronald Bailey, Fast Growth Can Solve Climate Change, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fast-gro
wth-can-solve-climate-change (“To truly address climate change, responsible pol-
icy makers should select courses of action that move humanity from slow- to high-
growth trajectories, especially for the poorest developing countries.”). 
 16 See John Gelissen, Explaining Popular Support for Environmental Protec-
tion A Multilevel Analysis of 50 Nations, ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR, at 396 
409-411 (May 2007), available at http://eab.sagepub.com/content/39/3/392.full.
pdf+html. 
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environmental destruction in poorer ones.17 Notwithstanding the 
complexities between climate change and the socioeconomic condi-
tions affecting various sovereigns, one of the few clear connections 
between climate change and the economy is that climate change 
poses a monumental threat to global economic health.18 
Trade constitutes a significant portion of the global economy; in 
recent decades, countries around the world have increasingly relied 
on trade agreements to facilitate trade between their nations.19 While 
recent trade agreements entered into by the United States have in-
cluded sections devoted to environmental issues, the effectiveness 
of those provisions have been questioned. Moreover, each of these 
free trade agreements (“FTAs”) contain investor protection provi-
sions which threaten to frustrate well-intentioned attempts by na-
tional governments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 
blocking, or greatly increasing the cost of, effective enforcement of 
climate change regulations. 
                                                                                                             
 17 See R. Kerry Turner and Brendan Fisher, Environmental Economics: To 
the Rich Man the Spoils, 451 NATURE, at 1067-68 (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.na-
ture.com/nature/journal/v451/n7182/full/4511067a.html (“A significant propor-
tion of the cost burden of the low-income group is caused by the activities of the 
other groups: looking at climate-change damage alone, rich countries might al-
ready have imposed costs on poor countries greater than the poor countries’ ex-
isting foreign debt. The people bearing these costs include the one billion or so 
who already lack daily access to safe drinking water, electricity, secure food sup-
plies and basic education.”). 
 18 See Mike Scott, Climate Change Threatens Economic Growth - UN Re-
port. How Should Investors React?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikescott/2014/04/03/climate-change-threatens-
economic-growth-un-report-how-should-investors-react/#169f67c33062 (“The 
latest report from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
could not be clearer – climate change is a threat to economic growth.”); see also 
Larry Elliott, Climate change disaster is biggest threat to global economy in 2016, 
say experts, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.co
m/business/2016/jan/14/climate-change-disaster-is-biggest-threat-to-global-
economy-in-2016-say-experts (“A catastrophe caused by climate change is seen 
as the biggest potential threat to the global economy in 2016, according to a survey 
of 750 experts conducted by the World Economic Forum.”). 
 19 See IMF Staff, Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/np
/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm. 
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This note will examine the interplay between Trans-Pacific Part-
nership’s (“TPP’s”) environmental provisions and its investor pro-
visions, and the potential environmental impacts of each, including 
the potential effects of TPP on international efforts to create a legal 
regime that responds to climate change.20 
BACKGROUND 
The TPP is the largest FTA in history,21 so it is no surprise that 
the process of negotiating the agreement, as well as the agreement 
itself, have been heavily criticized and highly controversial. But, the 
TPP is far from the first FTA to receive criticism. Trade agreements 
and trade liberalization policies have a long history.22 FTAs are ef-
forts to increase trade by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers; 
they can take the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements.23 TPP 
                                                                                                             
 20 The real-world effects of TPP on efforts to slow down and control climate 
change, including the GHG emissions associated with increased trade and with 
the outsourcing of industry to countries with lower environmental regulations and 
higher energy intensities, as well as whether or not such outsourcing and increased 
trade will actually result from TPP, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 21 Brock R. Williams, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Compar-
ative Trade and Economic Analysis, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. , R 42344 (June 10, 
2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42344.pdf; TPP Full Text, OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agree-
ments/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter 
TPP]; Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny 
in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/bu
siness/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-is-reached.html?_r=0. 
 22 See Kristi L. Bergemann, A Digital Free Trade Zone and Necessarily-Reg-
ulated Self-Governance for Electronic Commerce: The World Trade Organiza-
tion, International Law, and Classical Liberalism in Cyberspace, 20 J. MARS-
HALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 595, 615 (2002), http://repository.jmls.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=jitpl (stating that the roots of free 
trade go back to the mid-seventeenth century); see also Simon Lester, The Limits 
of Multiculturalism: Incorporating (Some) Unilateral Free Trade Into the Trad-
ing System, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 9, 11-12 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.vjil.org/ar-
ticles/the-limits-of-multilateralism-incorporating-some-unilateral-free-trade-
into-the-trading-system (discussing England’s repeal of the Corn Law tariffs in 
1846, and the reactions of free trade proponents to the mid nineteenth century 
tariff reduction treaty discussions between England and France.). 
 23 William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and 
Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31356, at 2, 4 
(Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31356.pdf. 
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proponents tout that the agreement may reduce or eliminate almost 
18,000 individual tariffs.24 
Despite the recent successes FTA proponents have had in imple-
menting new agreements, FTAs are often heavily criticized by a va-
riety of domestic interest groups. The Dominican Republic-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement was “criticized as perpetuating a 
deeply flawed and inadequate labor situation.”25 The North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement26 (“NAFTA”) was criticized from “all 
areas of the political spectrum.”27 One recurring critique of FTAs is 
based on their environmental implications because FTAs can pro-
mote environmentally destructive activities through several mecha-
nisms. 
One of the most fundamental, adverse environmental effects of 
FTAs is the increased environmental destruction that accompanies 
the increased economic activity that FTAs are often projected to cre-
ate.28 Higher-volume cross-border trade results in greenhouse gas 
emissions (“GHG”) both from the production of the traded goods 
and from the transportation of those goods between trading part-
ners.29 Lower tariffs can lead to higher production of certain goods, 
which proponents of FTAs often highlight. Trade liberalization can 
                                                                                                             
 24 Michael Froman, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 18,000 Tax Cuts on 
Made-in-America Exports – A Guide to How Tax Cuts Will Benefit Exporting in 
Your State, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.
gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Guide-to-18000-Tax-Cuts.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 
2016). 
 25 Laura Glass-Hess, Ready or Not, Here Comes DR-CAFTA: Comparing the 
Right of Association in Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador, 35 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 333, 335 (2007) (noting that DR-CAFTA passed Congress by an “ex-
tremely narrow margin.”). 
 26 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 
art. 1102, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 27 Vanessa Humm, American Trade News Highlights for Spring 2014 Prom-
ises Kept and Promises Broken-Nafta at Twenty, 20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 363, 
364–65 (2014) (“Environmental and agricultural groups were split in their support 
and criticism for the agreement. Further, while most business groups supported 
NAFTA, it received opposition from ‘labor, civil rights, human rights, certain 
business, and other groups.’”). 
 28 See Peter L. Lallas, NAFTA and Evolving Approaches to Identify and Ad-
dress “Indirect” Environmental Impacts of International Trade, 5 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 519, 530-34 (1993). 
 29 Anca Cristea, et al., Trade and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Inter-
national Freight Transport, 65 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 153, 154 (2013). 
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also lead a country to shift its trade to more distant partners, which 
leads to higher GHG emissions during transport.30 
A more complex interaction between FTAs and environmental 
harm hinges on the former’s potential for creating pollution ha-
vens,31 a point on which NAFTA has been criticized.32 Generally, 
the United States has stronger environmental laws than Mexico and 
is better at enforcing those laws.33 At the time that NAFTA was be-
ing debated this disparity led to fears that U.S. companies that had 
previously passed on their environmental compliance cost to con-
sumers would no longer remain competitive with factories in Mex-
ico once tariffs on Mexican goods were eliminated.34 It was feared 
that this would cause U.S. companies to relocate to Mexico, thereby 
avoiding stronger U.S. environmental laws, and increasing their 
overall pollution release.35 As will be discussed further below, one 
very concerning aspect of NAFTA and other FTAs is the potential 
for investor protection provisions to be used to circumvent environ-
mental laws. 
In response to environmental and labor concerns, then presiden-
tial candidate, Bill Clinton, decided to only support NAFTA if its 
environmental and labor provisions were strengthened.36 Ulti-
mately, the NAFTA parties addressed environmental concerns in a 
                                                                                                             
 30 Id. 
 31 Lallas, supra note 28, at 534–35. 
 32 See Carl F. Schwenker, Protecting the Environment and U.S. Competitive-
ness in the Era of Free Trade: A Proposal, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1372 (1993). 
 33 Id. at 1370. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1372–74. Fortunately, several studies have found that the pollution 
haven effect never came to fruition. See John H. Knox, The Neglected Lessons of 
the NAFTA Environmental Regime, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 398 (2010) 
(“Studies, including those prepared under the auspices of the CEC itself, have 
consistently indicated that the fear of pollution havens is largely baseless. The 
marginal costs of abating pollution in developed countries, such as the United 
States, are simply not high enough to induce companies to move their operations 
abroad in search of lower costs in countries with lower environmental standards. 
As a result, whether the Pollution Haven Package is strong enough to avert an 
environmental race to the bottom is moot; no such race is occurring.”). 
 36 David A. Gantz, Labor Rights and Environmental Protection Under 
NAFTA and Other U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
297, 309 (2011). 
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side agreement known as the North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”).37 NAFTA is credited as one of 
the first FTAs to incorporate environmental provisions38 and subse-
quent U.S. FTAs have followed NAFTA’s example.39 
NAFTA’s environmental provisions, however, have been far 
from successful: “As an attempt to solve ‘trade-and-environment’ 
problems, [NAFTA] is undoubtedly a failure . . . .The regime has 
had its greatest success as a regional effort to promote sustainable 
development. It has contributed to stronger environmental protec-
tions, especially in Mexico.”40 Inclusion of anti-pollution haven lan-
guage within NAFTA’s environmental provisions appears to have 
been unnecessary.41 While NAFTA’s environmental provisions 
have in some instances contributed to stronger environmental pro-
tections, at other times NAFTA’s investor provisions have frustrated 
attempts to implement environmental laws. Furthermore, despite its 
environmental provisions, NAFTA has been implicated in increased 
deforestation in Mexico as some Mexican farmers rushed to clear 
land to compete with the influx of cheap U.S. corn.42 
Since the adoption of NAFTA, the threats posed by climate 
change have become more and more clear, and the environmental 
community has increasingly focused its attention on the potential for 
a warming climate to exacerbate almost all other environmental 
                                                                                                             
 37 Chris Wold, Evaluating NAFTA and the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation: Lessons for Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade 
Agreements, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 201, 203 (2008). 
 38 David P. Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental Savior 
or Regulatory Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2014). 
 39 Daniel John Monahan, Breaking NAFTA’s Habits: The Pacific Rim Dis-
pute and the Ongoing Challenge of Fostering Environmental Protection in the 
Age of Free Trade, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 251, 263 (2012). 
 40 See Knox, supra note 35, at 392 (2010). 
 41 See Monahan, supra note 39. 
 42 Gloria Soto, Environmental Impact of Agricultural Trade Liberalization 
under NAFTA, POLITICS & POLICY, 471, 483 (June 2012) (“The implication is that 
NAFTA’s likely effect contributed 24 percent of the forest and jungle loss of this 
period. Other states that registered an important effect were San Luis Potosí, 
where direct conversion of forest and jungle areas to nonirrigated corn lands ac-
counted to 89,092 hectares, which represented 37.3 percent of the forest and jun-
gle loss for the whole period. The relative importance of deforestation due to 
greater small-scale corn agriculture was also significant in Tabasco (31.5 percent), 
Oaxaca (17.3 percent), and Campeche (10.4 percent). These figures reveal the 
impact of NAFTA in terms of deforestation and loss of carbon sinks in Mexico.”). 
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problems. Thus, the potential for TPP to intensify climate change, 
or at least its failure to strongly combat climate change, has led to 
considerable opposition from environmental groups.43 Not all envi-
ronmental groups have come out in opposition to TPP, however.44 
This disagreement within the environmental community might be 
due to a split in thinking regarding whether the benefits of TPP’s 
environmental provisions will outweigh the likely negative environ-
mental impacts of TPP’s investor protection provisions. 
Like NAFTA, the Central America Free Trade Agreement-Do-
minican Republic (“CAFTA-DR”),45 the United States-Peru Trade 
Promotion Agreement (“PTPA”),46 the United States-Panama Trade 
Promotion Agreement (“Panama TPA”),47 and the TPP all include 
investor protection provisions as well environmental provisions. 
FTA environmental provisions generally attempt to strengthen 
member countries’ environmental enforcement – or at least to pre-
vent countries from purposefully weakening environmental rules as 
a means to encourage investment. FTA investor provisions, on the 
other hand, can lead to liability on the part of a state for its enforce-
ment of certain laws and regulations by empowering investors from 
one of the FTA countries to raise an investor-state dispute claim di-
rectly against the host country’s government, and NAFTA greatly 
expanded the scope of such proceedings.48 Depending on how 
                                                                                                             
 43 Ilana Solomon, After Text Release, Environmental Groups Speak Out on 
Trans-Pacific Trade Deal, SIERRA CLUB (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.sierraclub.o
rg/tpp-text-release-enviros. 
 44 Letter from Mark R. Tercek, President & CEO, to President Barack 
Obama, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Oct. 05, 2015), available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/natureconservancytpp.pdf. 




 46 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text [here-
inafter PTPA]. 
 47 United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 
2007, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-
text [hereinafter Panama TPA]. 
 48 See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? 
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International 
“Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 44-45 (2003). 
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broadly TPP’s investor protection provisions are interpreted, they 
can expose member countries to significant liability for otherwise 
legal regulatory efforts, including even those regulations that are 
specifically protected by TPP’s environmental provisions. A partic-
ularly effective, or threatening, tool provided to investors by modern 
FTAs is the bar on measures “tantamount to nationalization or ex-
propriation of . . . an investment . . . .”49 Even if a state is not found 
liable, the threat of litigation, and the large potential damage awards 
it could bring, might chill attempts to effectively regulate environ-
mentally destructive activities.50 
Section I of this note will examine the TPP’s environmental pro-
visions. First, in Part. A, I will compare TPP’s environmental pro-
visions to those of earlier FTAs by analyzing changes to the binding, 
or non-binding, nature of certain parts as well as changes to the 
breadth of environmental issues covered by the provisions. Part B 
will analyze how TPP’s treatment of multilateral environmental 
agreements differ from those of earlier agreements. Part C will then 
discuss how TPP’s environmental provisions are to be enforced. 
Section II will focus on TPP’s investor protection provisions. The 
analysis begins with Part A, which examines the evolving interpre-
tation by arbitral panels of NAFTA’s expropriation provision. Part 
B will explore the evolution of the expropriation standard from 
NAFTA to TPP by reviewing textual changes and arbitral decisions. 
Section III will then evaluate the potential conflict between TPP’s 
environmental provisions and its investor provisions and illuminate 
some potential consequences of each chapter on international efforts 
to halt climate change.51 
                                                                                                             
 49 Vincent, supra note 38, at 11. 
 50 See Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and 
Other U.S. “Trade” Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN, 11-16 (June 2015), http://www.citi-
zen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf (“The Ethyl arbitration was initiated 
after Canada banned the toxic substance MMT. Ethyl sought $250 million, alleg-
ing that the Canadian regulation indirectly expropriated its investment. Canada 
tried to dispose of the claim by arguing that Ethyl did not have standing to bring 
a claim under NAFTA, but Less than a month after losing the jurisdictional ruling, 
the Canadian government announced that it would settle with Ethyl. The terms of 
that settlement required the government to pay the firm $13 million in damages 
and legal fees, post advertising saying MMT was safe and reverse the ban on 
MMT.”) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN] 
 51 It is important to consider NAFTA and PTPA in this analysis, because TPP, 
once adopted, will supersede those agreements. CAFTA-DR and Panama TPA 
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ANALYSIS 
Section I - Environmental Provisions 
Proponents of TPP have forcefully argued that the agreement 
goes well beyond previous FTAs in expanding and enforcing envi-
ronmental protection. The Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative contends that “[i]n TPP, the United States has negotiated 
the most robust enforceable environment commitments of any trade 
agreement.”52 Writing for the White House Blog, Rohan Patel, Spe-
cial Assistant to the President and Deputy Director of Intergovern-
mental Affairs, argues that “TPP will help shape an international re-
sponse to the global environmental challenges we face on a bigger 
scale than ever before. TPP is packed with fully-enforceable, first-
ever provisions that can affect real-world change and address envi-
ronmental challenges and crises that threaten ecosystems, liveli-
hoods, and economies alike.”53 Several environmental organizations 
have offered support, albeit cautious support, for the environmental 
provisions in TPP. The World Wildlife Fund issued the following 
statement: 
No major trade agreement before this one has gone 
so far to address growing pressures on natural re-
sources like overexploited fish, wildlife, and for-
ests . . . .With the right implementation and compli-
ance procedures, the conservation commitments in 
                                                                                                             
are also helpful comparisons because CAFTA-DR was one of the earliest FTAs 
after NAFTA, and Panama TPA is one of the most recent FTAs. The investor 
protection provisions and environmental provisions in each of these FTAs share 
many similarities; however, each FTA differs in the extent to which it attempts to 
guide tribunals in determining whether an expropriation has occurred, as well as 
in the breadth and enforceability of its environmental provisions. 
 52 The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Preserving the Environment, OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/TPP-Preserving-the-Environment-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 
2016). 
 53 Rohan Patel, What Environmental and Conservation Advocates Are Saying 
About TPP’s Environment Chapter, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 6, 2015, 12:09 
PM), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/11/04/what-environme
ntal-and-conservation-advocates-are-saying-about-tpps-environment. 
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this trade agreement could be game-changers. Of 
course there’s more work to be done.54 
Similarly, the Nature Conservancy, in a letter to President 
Obama, stated: 
We are strongly encouraged by the environmental 
provisions in the recently concluded Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) agreement and congratulate you 
and your administration on the successful negotia-
tion of these provisions. By embedding conservation 
commitments in the core text of the agreement and 
making them subject to the TPP’s dispute resolution 
mechanisms, the TPP provides new leverage to ad-
vance vital environmental objectives.55 
Not all environmental groups agree with the assessments of the 
World Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy. The Sierra Club 
has taken a starkly different view: 
After nearly six years of Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) negotiations conducted under extraordinary 
secrecy, the release of the final text reveals that the 
TPP environment chapter fails to protect our envi-
ronment. The chapter excludes core environmental 
commitments that have been included in all U.S. 
trade agreements since 2007 and fails to meet the 
minimum degree of environmental protection re-
quired under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Pri-
orities and Accountability Act of 2015 . . . .Even 
more, it falls far short of the meaningful protections 
called for by environmental groups including the Si-
erra Club . . . .Provisions in the text that have been 
                                                                                                             
 54 WWF Statement on the Close of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotia-
tions, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Oct. 05, 2015), http://www.worldwildlife.org/pre
ss-releases/wwf-statement-on-the-close-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-negotia-
tions. 
 55 Tercek, supra note 44. 
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touted as new are generally hampered by weak lan-
guage that would not adequately protect the environ-
ment.56 
A. Breadth of Topics Covered, and their Binding, or Non-
Binding Nature 
Like all U.S. FTAs, many of the TPP’s environmental provisions 
regarding a party’s enforcement of its environmental laws are vague 
and aspirational. In language largely identical to that in CAFTA-
DR, TPP provides that “[n]o Party shall fail to effectively enforce 
its environmental laws through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment be-
tween the Parties.”57 Like previous agreements, TPP does not re-
quire that a party’s environmental laws meet any specific standard, 
providing only that “[e]ach Party shall strive to ensure that its envi-
ronmental laws and policies provide for, and encourage, high levels 
of environmental protection and to continue to improve its respec-
tive levels of environmental protection.”58 The non-binding nature 
of these sections is clarified by a subsequent section, which states 
the following: 
The Parties recognise that each Party retains the 
right to exercise discretion and to make decisions 
regarding: (a) investigatory, prosecutorial, regula-
tory, and compliance matters; and (b) the allocation 
of environmental enforcement resources with respect 
to other environmental laws determined to have 
higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand 
that with respect to the enforcement of environmen-
tal laws, a Party is in compliance with paragraph 
4 if a course of action or inaction reflects a rea-
sonable exercise of that discretion . . . .59 
                                                                                                             
 56 TPP Text Analysis: Environment Chapter Fails to Protect the Environ-
ment, SIERRA CLUB 1, https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files
/uploads-wysiwig/tpp-analysis-updated.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 57 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.3(4) (emphasis added). 
 58 Id. at art. 20.3(3) (emphasis added). 
 59 Id. at art. 20.3(5) (emphasis added). 
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TPP, like recent FTAs such as Panama TPA, does contain some 
binding sections within its environmental provisions. For example, 
TPP states that “a Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, 
or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws 
in a manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those 
laws in order to encourage trade.”60 Whereas, the comparable sec-
tion of CAFTA-DR states that “each Party shall strive to ensure that 
it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, such laws  . . . .”61 
TPP also differs from earlier FTAs in that it contains a number 
of specific environmental provisions covering a broad spectrum of 
environmental issues. These include sections that focus specifically 
on ozone protection,62 marine ship pollution,63 trade and biodiver-
sity,64 invasive alien species,65 fisheries,66 as well as the transition 
to a low-emissions economy.67 While many of these provisions are 
non-binding, a number of the provisions do contain binding compo-
nents. It is far from clear, however, what overall effect these provi-
sions will have. 
Among the provisions in the environmental section with some 
binding effects are those dealing with fisheries and with ozone pro-
tection.68 Much of section 20.16 of the TPP, Marine Capture Fish-
eries, is non-binding. For example, 20.16(3) merely provides that 
“each Party shall seek to operate a fisheries management system 
that regulates marine wild capture fishing and that is designed to: (a) 
prevent overfishing and overcapacity; (b) reduce bycatch . . . and (c) 
                                                                                                             
 60 Compare id. at art. 20.3(6) (emphasis added) with Panama TPA, supra note 
39, at art. 17.3 2. (“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade 
or investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic en-
vironmental laws. Accordingly, neither Party shall waive or otherwise derogate 
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that 
weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws in a manner affecting 
trade or investment between the Parties.”). 
 61 CAFTA-DR, supra note 45, art. 17.2(2): Enforcement of Environmental 
Laws (emphasis added). 
 62 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.5. 
 63 Id. at art. 20.6. 
 64 Id. at art. 20.13. 
 65 Id. at art. 20.14. 
 66 Id. at art. 20.16. 
 67 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.15. 
 68 Id. at art. 20.16, 20.5. 
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promote the recovery of overfished stocks . . . .”69 Similarly, 
20.16(4) provides only that: 
Each Party shall promote the long-term conservation 
of sharks, marine turtles, seabirds, and marine mam-
mals, through the implementation and effective en-
forcement of conservation and management 
measures. Such measures should include, as appro-
priate: (a) for sharks: the collection of species spe-
cific data, fisheries bycatch mitigation measures, 
catch limits, and finning prohibitions; (b) for marine 
turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals: fisheries by-
catch mitigation measures, conservation and relevant 
management measures, prohibitions, and other 
measures in accordance with relevant international 
agreements to which the Party is party.70 
Section 20.16 does, however, contain one binding component. 
Section 20.16(5) provides that “no Party shall grant or maintain” 
specific fishing subsidies, including “subsidies for fishing that neg-
atively affect fish stocks that are in an overfished condition . . . .”71 
Section 20.16(6) further provides that existing fishing subsidies 
“shall be brought into conformity with that paragraph as soon as 
possible and no later than three years of the date of entry into force 
of this Agreement . . . .”72 Despite fisheries subsidies restrictions 
and provisions meant to protect sharks, it has been argued that the 
overall effect of TPP on sharks will be very destructive because of 
the following: 
Four of the five largest shark-fin importers in the 
world are TPP countries. That includes Vietnam, the 
world’s 4th-largest importer of shark fins by volume, 
which currently imposes a 20-percent tariff on shark 
fins. TPP member Malaysia, meanwhile, is the 
world’s 9th-largest importer of shark fins, with a 7-
percent shark-fin tariff. These tariffs make imported 
                                                                                                             
 69 Id. at art. 20.16(3)(a-c) (emphasis added). 
 70 Id. at art. 20.16(4)(a-b). 
 71 Id. at art. 20.16(5)(a). 
 72 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.16(6). 
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shark fins more expensive, therefore restricting trade 
in shark fins and reducing the killing of sharks. On 
the very first day the TPP is implemented, however, 
these tariffs would be eliminated for shark fins im-
ported from other TPP countries, such as Peru and 
Mexico – the 5th- and 7th-largest exporters of shark 
fins in the world, respectively.73 
This argument has been extended to project a significant nega-
tive effect from TPP on certain rainforests and rainforest species, as 
well as on African elephants, because the TPP will reduce or elimi-
nate tariffs on palm oil and legal ivory.74 
Another binding section within the environmental provisions is 
section 20.5, which addresses ozone emissions.75 This provision 
provides that “each Party shall take measures to control the produc-
tion and consumption of, and trade in, such substances” and that “[a] 
Party shall be deemed in compliance with this provision if it main-
tains the measure or measures listed in Annex 20-A implementing 
its obligations under the Montreal Protocol or any subsequent meas-
ure or measures that provide an equivalent or higher level of envi-
ronmental protection . . . .”76 
B. TPP’s Approach to Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
While TPP’s environmental provisions are roughly similar to 
those in CAFTA-DR, PTPA, and Panama TPA, some environmental 
groups have argued that TPP’s environmental provisions are weaker 
than those of U.S. FTAs enacted after May 10, 2007, including Pan-
ama TPA. On May 10, 2007, the Bush Administration and the 110th 
Congress agreed to make the enforcement of several multilateral en-
vironmental agreements (“MEAs”) a policy priority of pending 
                                                                                                             
 73 Ben Beachy, Sharks, Tigers, and Elephants: New Analysis Reveals TPP 
Threats to Endangered Species, SIERRA CLUB, at 2-3 (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www
.sierraclub.org/compass/2015/12/sharks-tigers-and-elephants-new-analysis-re-
veals-tpp-threats-endangered-species. 
 74 Id. at 3. 
 75 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.5. 
 76 Id. at art. 20.5(1) n. 4. 
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FTAs.77 All U.S. FTAs entered into after May 10, 2007, have re-
quired parties to “adopt, maintain, and implement laws, regula-
tions, and all other measures to fulfill its obligations under” seven 
different multilateral environmental agreements [MEAs].78 The 
seven MEAs included are the following: 
(a) the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at 
Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended; (b) the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, 
as adjusted and amended; (c) the Protocol of 1978 
Relating to the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, done at Lon-
don, February 17, 1978, as amended; (d) the Conven-
tion on Wetlands of International Importance Espe-
cially as Waterfowl Habitat, done at Ramsar, Febru-
ary 2, 1971, as amended; (e) the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
done at Canberra, May 20, 1980; (f) the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done at 
Washington, December 2, 1946; and (g) the Conven-
tion for the Establishment of an Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission, done at Washington, 
May 31, 1949.79 
However, the “TPP only requires countries in the pact to ‘adopt, 
maintain, and implement’ domestic policies to fulfill one of the 
seven core MEAs . . . .”80 
The TPP only explicitly uses the “adopt, maintain, and imple-
ment” language in reference to the Convention on International 
                                                                                                             
 77 See Cooper, supra note 23, at 5; J. F. HORNBECK, The U.S.-Panama Free 
Trade Agreement, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32540, at 1 (2012), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32540.pdf. 
 78 See e.g., Panama TPA, supra note 47, at art. 17.2 (Environmental Agree-
ments) (emphasis added). 
 79 Panama TPA, supra note 47, at Annex 17.2(a-g). 
 80 SIERRA CLUB, supra note 56, at 2. 
242 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:2 
 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.81 As dis-
cussed above, however, TPP also specifically references the Mon-
treal Protocol, albeit not with the exact “adopt, maintain, and imple-
ment” language. Furthermore, though TPP does not enforce the re-
maining MEAs in the same manner as earlier U.S. FTAs, it appears 
that these MEAs have not been completely ignored. Whereas earlier 
U.S. FTAs such as PTPA and Panama TPA define “environmental 
law” to mean “any statute or regulation of a Party, or provision 
thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protection of the envi-
ronment,”82 the TPP defines “environmental law” to mean “a statute 
or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof, including any that 
implements the Party’s obligations under a multilateral envi-
ronmental agreement, the primary purpose of which is the protec-
tion of the environment . . . .”83 Thus, Article 20.3(4), in stating that 
“no Party shall fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws 
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a 
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties,” is actu-
ally creating a binding enforcement provision for laws implement-
ing seemingly any MEA.84 Similarly, Article 20.7(5), which states 
that “[e]ach Party shall provide appropriate sanctions or remedies 
for violations of its environmental laws for the effective enforce-
ment of those laws,” also applies to laws implementing MEAs.85 
Article 20.3(6)86 also applies to MEAs. Combined, TPP Articles 
20.3(4) and 20.7(5) seem to require that a member Party’s laws or 
regulations implementing an MEA be implemented, and Article 
20.3(6) seems to require that such laws be maintained. Therefore, 
the actual difference between TPP’s MEA enforcement measures, 
and those found in FTAs like Panama TPA, is that TPP does not 
provide that parties must “adopt . . . laws, regulations, and . . . other 
measures to fulfill [their] obligations under” MEAs.87 TPP’s MEA 
                                                                                                             
 81 Id.; TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.17(2). 
 82 Panama TPA, supra note 47, at art. 17.14(1). 
 83 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.1 (emphasis added). 
 84 Id. at art. 20.3(4) (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. at art. 20.7(5) (emphasis added). 
 86 “[A] Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or 
reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order to encourage trade or in-
vestment between the Parties . . . .” Id., at art. 20.3(6). 
 87 Panama TPA, supra note 47, at art. 17.2 (emphasis added). 
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provision has also been weakened because application of Articles 
20.3(4) and 20.3(6) are limited to instances in which the action in 
question affects trade or investment between the parties.88 Whether 
this distinction renders TPP’s MEA provisions toothless is unclear 
at this point. It is possible, however, that by incorporating seemingly 
any MEA rather than the seven included in earlier agreements, the 
TPP actually provides for broader enforcement of MEAs than do 
earlier FTAs. 
C. Enforcement of TPP’s Environmental Provisions 
TPP provides two mechanisms for enforcing the provisions of 
the environmental section. One is Article 20.9 (Public Submissions), 
which specifies that “[e]ach Party shall provide for the receipt and 
consideration of written submissions from persons of that Party re-
garding its implementation of this Chapter.”89 The other enforce-
ment mechanism is Chapter 28 (Dispute Resolution), which applies 
“wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of 
another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of this 
Agreement or that another Party has otherwise failed to carry out its 
obligations under this Agreement.”90 Importantly, neither enforce-
ment option is as powerful as the investor-state arbitration system 
provided for private investors under Chapter 9 (Investment), be-
cause they provide “neither an international standard for environ-
mental protection, nor a dispute resolution process by which private 
parties seeking to enjoin or punish environmental malfeasance may 
sue for an order stating such events have occurred.”91 
The Public Submissions section provides only that: 
If a submission asserts that a Party is failing to effec-
tively enforce its environmental laws and following 
the written response to the submission by that Party, 
any other Party may request that the Committee on 
Environment (Committee) discuss that submission 
                                                                                                             
 88 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.3(4) and 20.3(6). 
 89 Id. at art. 20.9(1). 
 90 Id. at art. 20.2(b). 
 91 Bradley N. Lewis, Biting Without Teeth: The Citizen Submission Process 
and Environmental Protection, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1241 (2007). Although 
this article was discussing NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, the environmental provision 
enforcement mechanisms in those agreements are very similar to those in TPP. 
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and written response with a view to further under-
standing the matter raised in the submission and, as 
appropriate, to consider whether the matter could 
benefit from cooperative activities92 
This process does not result in any “legally binding effect on the 
Parties.”93 Moreover, TPP’s environmental provisions lack a feature 
that even NAFTA included; public submissions leading to a factual 
record. This is very concerning because “[i]n other U.S. FTAs of-
fering a public submission process, including the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), CAFTA-DR, 
the PTPA, the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, and the 
U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, the final factual record 
is what drives the public to utilize this enforcement mechanism.”94 
Under Chapter 28 (Dispute Resolution), if consultation between 
the parties does not resolve the dispute, a panel may be formed to 
determine whether the measures taken by the responding party are 
“inconsistent with [its] obligations under [the] Agreement,” or 
whether the responding party has “failed to carry out its obligations 
under [the] Agreement . . . .”95 If the panel finds that such a violation 
of TPP has occurred, the complaining party may be entitled to sus-
pend the responding party’s benefits or compensation.96 While party 
dispute resolution is a potentially powerful tool for enforcing the 
provisions of the environment chapter, “no Party has ever brought a 
formal case based on the environmental provisions of any U.S. 
FTA—despite documented violations.”97 
In sum, as with earlier FTAs, the environmental provisions in 
TPP are largely non-binding. TPP does contain some binding provi-
sions, including in sections dealing with specific environmental con-
cerns that were not explicitly addressed in earlier FTAs. While 
                                                                                                             
 92 TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.9(4). 
 93 The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of 
Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7, http://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TPP-
Enforcement-Analysis-Nov2015.pdf [hereinafter CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]. 
 94 Id. at 5. 
 95 TPP, supra note 21, at 28.17(4)(b). 
 96 See id. at art. 28.20. 
 97 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 93, at 1. 
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TPP’s MEA provisions diverge significantly from the approach 
taken by earlier FTAs, the end result may be that TPP incorporates 
a greater number of MEAs than earlier agreements did, but the en-
forcements of covered MEAs may have been more thorough in ear-
lier agreements. Finally, TPP incorporates enforcement mechanisms 
for its environmental provisions similar to those in earlier FTAs; 
however, the failure in TPP to include a public submissions process 
that leads to a factual record is a significant step backward. 
Section II - Investor Protection 
NAFTA was one of the first FTAs to create a mechanism for 
investors to bring their disputes directly against member states, but 
this is now standard practice.98 In contrast to the enforcement mech-
anisms available for FTA environmental provisions, the enforce-
ment mechanisms for investor provisions have been widely used and 
rather successful at protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of the 
investment chapter. NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, PTPA, Panama TPA, 
and TPP all provide essentially equivalent categories of investor 
protection and all allow for investor state dispute settlement as a 
means of enforcing those protections. These categories are called 
national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, minimum stand-
ard of treatment, and expropriation and compensation. In NAFTA, 
these standards provide that each nation party to the agreement 
“shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favora-
ble than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own inves-
tors . . . “ (national treatment);99 that “[e]ach Party shall accord to 
investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of 
a non-Party . . . “ (most-favored-nation treatment);100 that “[e]ach 
Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treat-
ment in accordance with international law, including fair and equi-
table treatment . . . “ (minimum standard of treatment);101 and, that 
“[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a 
                                                                                                             
 98 Monahan, supra note 39, at 261. 
 99 NAFTA, supra note 26, at art. 1102. 
 100 Id. at art. 1103. 
 101 Id. at art. 1105. 
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measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation . . . “ (expro-
priation and compensation).102 Of these investor protection catego-
ries, protection against expropriation has been subject to the most 
revision between FTAs.103 For the most part, however, the investor 
protections offered by FTAs since, and including, NAFTA have re-
mained constant. Furthermore, where the language of the agree-
ments may have differed, arbitral tribunals have often provided in-
terpretations that bring the provisions into greater conformity. 
A. Arbitral Interpretations of NAFTA’s Expropriation 
Provision 
NAFTA’s expropriation and compensation section provides 
that: 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or ex-
propriate an investment of an investor of another 
Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an invest-
ment (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public pur-
pose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in ac-
cordance with due process of law and Article 
1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensa-
tion . . . .104 
Several aspects of this provision render it vague. First, while it 
would clearly violate this NAFTA provision’s bar against direct ex-
propriations if a party were to nationalize a privately owned com-
pany belonging to an investor of another party, it is less clear when 
exactly an indirect expropriation has occurred. Though the concept 
of “indirect” expropriations has been described as analogous to 
                                                                                                             
 102 Id. at art. 1110. 
 103 Between NAFTA and CAFTA-DR the expropriation section gained an an-
nex in order to guide arbitral tribunals’ interpretations. While the minimum stand-
ard of treatment section also gained an annex in CAFTA-DR, that addition was 
far simpler than the expropriation annex. See also Meredith Wilensky, Reconcil-
ing International Investment Law and Climate Change Policy: Potential Liability 
for Climate Measures Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10683, 10693 (2015) (“Tribunals initiated under existing IIAs 
have taken a more consistent approach toward national treatment and MFN obli-
gations than they have toward indirect expropriation and FET obligations.”). 
 104 NAFTA, supra note 26, at art. 1110. 
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“regulatory takings” in U.S. takings jurisprudence,105 its inclusion 
in NAFTA’s expropriation provision has been a cause for concern. 
This is because “[d]espite claims that NAFTA simply ‘exports’ the 
U.S. takings standard, the tribunals’ interpretations of the expropri-
ation provision have exceeded the substantive scope of U.S. com-
pensation requirements, while removing procedural limitations typ-
ically imposed on domestic takings claims.”106 
Second, what constitutes a measure “tantamount” to expropria-
tion? How, if at all, does a measure “tantamount” to expropriation 
differ from an expropriation? The “tantamount” language has re-
peatedly been used to argue for a broader “scope of what could be 
considered an indirect expropriation”; leaving the question to “indi-
vidual tribunals to determine otherwise.”107 This creates a “looming 
possibility of a broad application of the expropriation provision un-
der Article 1110.”108 Such a possibility raises concerns about the fu-
ture ability of governments to legislate and regulate . . . .”109 These 
questions have caused uncertainty for regulators and investors, and 
have been a source of fear among environmentalists opposed to 
FTAs. 
In order to understand why some environmentalists feel that 
NAFTA’s expropriation provision is so dangerous, it is necessary to 
first consider several NAFTA arbitral decisions. Here, a distinction 
must be made between actions that various claimants have alleged 
constitute expropriation and what tribunals have actually held to 
constitute an expropriation. Expropriation claims are commonly 
brought, but are very rarely successful. Claims that a government 
has violated one of the other investor protections are successful 
much more often than expropriation claims. Overall, investors have 
had some degree of success challenging the actions of governments 
                                                                                                             
 105 Michael Muse-Fisher, CAFTA-DR and the Iterative Process of Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Making: Towards A United States Takings Framework for An-
alyzing International Expropriation Claims, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. 
& DEV. L.J. 495, 526 (2007) (“Even before CAFTA-DR’s inception, the similar-
ities between international indirect expropriation law and U.S. regulatory takings 
jurisprudence had already been recognized by many legal scholars.”). 
 106 Been & Beauvais, supra note 48, at 30. 
 107 Muse-Fisher, supra note 105, at 506. 
 108 Michael G. Parisi, Moving Toward Transparency? An Examination of Reg-
ulatory Takings in International Law, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383, 404 (2005). 
 109 Id. 
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under FTAs. A June 2015 analysis by the nonprofit group, Public 
Citizen, found that a total of 88 claims had been filed by investors 
under NAFTA-style deals (a broader category than the FTAs con-
sidered in this Note); of those 88 cases, 22 were dismissed (a win 
for the government), and investors won 15 cases.110 The analysis 
concluded that those 15 cases resulted in governments paying 
$444.1 million to foreign investors.111 
Nevertheless, environmentalists can find plenty of reasons to 
fret over certain arbitral decisions even though those claimants ulti-
mately failed on the merits of their expropriation claim. Several ar-
bitral decisions show that tribunals are open to rather broad inter-
pretations of expropriation, even if no expropriation was found in 
that specific arbitration. The case that originally confirmed the en-
vironmental community’s worst fears was Metalclad Corp. v. 
United Mexican States.112 This case stemmed from Metalclad’s de-
cision to purchase a Mexican corporation named COTERIN, which 
had been granted certain state and federal permits for the construc-
                                                                                                             
 110 Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and 
Other U.S. “Trade” Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN 40 (June 2015), http://www.citi-
zen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Vincent, supra note 38, at 15 (“The outcomes of Metalclad and Ethyl Corp. 
gave environmentalists serious concerns about the increasing scope of investor-
state claims”); Katie Zaunbrecher, Pac Rim Cayman v. Republic of El Salvador: 
Confronting Free Trade’s Chilling Effect on Environmental Progress in Latin 
America, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 489, 491 (2011) (“During the expedited CAFTA-
DR negotiations, environmentalists and legal scholars heatedly discussed whether 
the Central American agreement could or should improve upon NAFTA’s weak 
environmental protections, particularly the Chapter 11 investor-state dispute res-
olution mechanism that had allowed Metalclad’s judgment against Mexico.”); 
Joshua Elcombe, Regulatory Powers v. Investment Protection Under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 1110:Metalclad, Methanex, and Glamis Gold, 68 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 71, 
79 (2010) (“Critics cite Metalclad as proof that Chapter 11 could impose signifi-
cant constraints on the NAFTA states’ ability to protect the environment, labour 
standards, and their populations’ health.”). 
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tion and operation of a transfer station for hazardous waste, in Sep-
tember of 1993.113 In 1991, COTERIN had been denied a local con-
struction permit for the hazardous waste disposal site project.114 
Metalclad claimed that it would not have purchased COTERIN “but 
for the apparent approval and support of the project by federal and 
state officials.”115 Metalclad began construction of the hazardous 
waste dump in May of 1994; five months later the local government 
ordered that construction be stopped because Metalclad lacked a 
municipal construction permit.116 Shortly thereafter, Metalclad sim-
ultaneously resumed construction and applied for a municipal con-
struction permit.117 In December of 1995, thirteen months after 
Metalclad’s application had been submitted, the municipal construc-
tion permit was denied; however, Metalclad had already completed 
construction nine months earlier.118 The municipality then initiated 
court proceedings, which resulted in an injunction barring the oper-
ation of the hazardous waste facility.119 In January of 1997, 
Metalclad initiated arbitral proceedings under NAFTA.120 Several 
months later, the governor of the state issued a decree declaring the 
area encompassing Metalclad’s hazardous waste site “a Natural 
Area for the protection of rare cactus.”121 
Metalclad maintained that it had been informed by federal offi-
cials that it had all the authority necessary to construct and operate 
the landfill; that federal officials said it should apply for the munic-
ipal construction permit to facilitate an amicable relationship with 
                                                                                                             
 113 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 
28-35 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/cas
e-documents/ita0510.pdf [hereinafter Metalclad Award]. 
 114 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Counter-Memorial, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Feb. 17, 1998), available at http://naftaclaims.com/dis-
putes/mexico/Metalclad/MetalCladMexicoCounterMemorial.pdf, para. 50; see 
also Metaclad Award, supra 113, at para. 44. 
 115 Metalclad Award, supra note 113, at para. 36. 
 116 See id. at para. 38-40. 
 117 Id. at para. 42. 
 118 Id. at para. 50. 
 119 Id. at para. 56. 
 120 Metalclad Award, supra note 113, at para. 58. 
 121 Id. at para. 59. 
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the Municipality; that federal officials assured it that the Municipal-
ity would issue the permit as a matter of course; and that the Munic-
ipality lacked any basis for denying the construction permit122 
Metalclad also asserted that “there was no evidence that the Mu-
nicipality ever required or issued a municipal construction permit 
for any other construction project . . . .”123 Mexico denied that any 
federal officials assured the company that no municipal permit was 
required,124 asserting that “Metalclad was aware through due dili-
gence that a municipal permit might be necessary on the basis of the 
case of COTERIN . . . .”125 
The tribunal found that “Metalclad was entitled to rely on the 
representations of federal officials and to believe that it was entitled 
to continue its construction of the landfill.”126 The tribunal further 
found that even if a municipal construction permit had been re-
quired, “the federal authority’s jurisdiction was controlling and the 
authority of the municipality only extended to appropriate construc-
tion considerations,” and not to environmental considerations.127 
The tribunal held that an expropriation under NAFTA includes not 
only open, deliberate, and acknowledged takings of property, such 
as outright seizure, or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour 
of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the 
use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole 
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected eco-
nomic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious ben-
efit of the host State.128 
The municipality acted outside of its authority in denying the 
construction permit based in part on its “perception of the adverse 
environmental effects of the hazardous waste landfill and the geo-
logical unsuitability of the landfill site.”129 This action, in conjunc-
tion with Metalclad’s reasonable reliance on the representations of 
the federal officials, and the unlawful prevention of Metalclad’s op-
                                                                                                             
 122 Id. at para. 41. 
 123 Id. at para. 52. 
 124 Id. at para. 41. 
 125 Metalclad Award, supra note 113, at para. 53. 
 126 Id. at para. 89. 
 127 Id. at para. 86. 
 128 Id. at para. 103. 
 129 Id. at para. 106. 
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eration of the hazardous waste landfill, amounted to an indirect ex-
propriation.130 The tribunal separately found that the ecological de-
cree issued by the governor constituted an expropriation because it 
“barr[ed] forever the operation of the landfill.”131 
 Several years after the Metalclad decision, a tribunal’s deci-
sion in Methanex v. United States eased the concerns of many envi-
ronmentalists.132 Methanex initiated its NAFTA claim after the gov-
ernor of California signed an Executive Order phasing out the use 
of a chemical known as MTBE in gasoline.133 MTBE was a gasoline 
additive meant to reduce auto emissions, but several studies indi-
cated that the compound might pose a health risk.134 The tribunal 
found that no expropriation had occurred and further held: 
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-dis-
criminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is 
enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment, 
is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless 
specific commitments had been given by the regulat-
ing government to the then putative foreign investor 
contemplating investment that the government 
would refrain from such regulation.135 
Methanex “did not enter the United States market because of 
special representations made to it”; furthermore, Methanex was 
aware that it had entered a highly regulated industry.136 “[T]he Cal-
ifornia ban was made for a public purpose, was non-discriminatory, 
                                                                                                             
 130 Metalclad Award, supra note 113, at para. 106-107. 
 131 Id. at para. 109. 
 132 Jordan C. Kahn, Striking Nafta Gold: Glamis Advances Investor-State Ar-
bitration, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 101, 112 (2009) (“Five years after 
Metalclad, Methanex eased environmentalists’ fears.”); Vincent, supra note 38, 
at 114 (“The outcomes of Metalclad and Ethyl Corp. gave environmentalists seri-
ous concerns about the increasing scope of investor-state claims, but in 1995, Me-
thanex v. California helped relieve some of the worry.”). 
 133 Vincent, supra note 38, at 116. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdic-
tion and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt. IV ch. D p.4 (2005), available at http://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf [hereinafter Methanex 
Final Award]. 
 136 Id. at p.5. 
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and was accomplished with due process. Hence, Methanex’s central 
claim under Article 1110(1) of expropriation under one of the three 
forms of action in that provision fails.”137 
Many of those upset by the Metalclad decision applauded the 
Methanex tribunal’s approach, believing that Methanex had repudi-
ated the earlier case.138 While the Methanex tribunal interpreted the 
expropriation clause much more narrowly than the Metalclad tribu-
nal, the Methanex “holding” does not bind any other NAFTA tribu-
nal.139 Furthermore, while the decision is a good one from a policy 
standpoint, certain aspects of the tribunal’s reasoning seem to be ra-
ther weak upon a close reading of the text of NAFTA’s expropria-
tion and compensation section. The Methanex tribunal held that be-
cause the ban was (1) made for a public purpose, (2) non-discrimi-
natory, and (3) done with due process, it did not constitute an expro-
priation. However, NAFTA’s expropriation section specifically 
states that a Party may not “expropriate an investment . . . except (a) 
for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in ac-
cordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on 
payment of compensation . . . .”140 Thus, the clause clearly envi-
sions that a non-discriminatory measure, done for a public purpose, 
and in accordance with due process, may constitute an expropria-
tion. In fact, this is the only type of expropriation sanctioned by 
NAFTA, as long as compensation is paid.141 
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. at p.10. 
 138 Elcombe, supra note 112, at 83 (“In its decision, the [Methanex] Tribunal 
arguably rejected the Metalclad approach . . . .”); Anatole Boute, The Potential 
Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate 
Change, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 333, 368 (2009) (“Finally, in the 
famous Methanex case, the arbitral tribunal confirmed this interpretation and thus 
rejected definitively the approach of the Metalclad tribunal.”). 
 139 NAFTA, supra note 26, at art. 1136(1). 
 140 Id. at art. 1110 (emphasis added). 
 141 Elcombe, supra note 112, at 85 (“According to the text of Article 1110(1), 
expropriatory measures which do not conform to 1110(1)(a), (b), (c), and (d) are 
flatly unpermitted and should be removed. Compensable expropriations are per-
mitted, but they must meet the four requirements set out in 1110(1). Following 
the Methanex Tribunal’s approach to expropriation, though, by fulfilling 
1110(1)(a), (b), and (c), compensable expropriations are not actually expropria-
tions in the first place, and hence Article 1110(1) does not apply. The compensa-
tion requirement in 1110(1)(d) could never have any effect.”). 
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In upholding the MTBE regulation as a non-expropriatory meas-
ure, the tribunal seemed most focused on “the fact that the investor 
should have expected such measures and that no contrary assurances 
were given by the host state.”142 In this sense, Methanex can actually 
be reconciled with Metalclad in that the Metalclad tribunal focused 
heavily on the assurances given to Metalclad by federal authorities, 
that all required permits had been acquired, and the reasonableness 
of Metalclad’s reliance on those assurances.143 Thus, the require-
ment that the investor’s investment be induced by government in-
surances will likely be the aspect of the Methanex decision to prove 
most durable. 
This is evidenced by NAFTA cases decided subsequent to Me-
thanex. Though, like Methanex, these cases have “express[ed] a cer-
tain willingness to bring customary international law approaches to 
expropriation into Article 1110,” for the most part, whether or not 
an expropriation has occurred has been determined based not on the 
character and purpose of the regulation, but instead “based on the 
quantum of damage to the investment.”144 
Another concerning aspect of NAFTA’s expropriation and com-
pensation section is the broad definition of property contained in the 
agreement and the even broader interpretation given to it by arbitral 
tribunals. In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, S.D. Myers, a U.S. com-
pany, challenged a temporary ban on the export of polychlorinated 
biphenyls (“PCB”).145 S.D. Myers owned a PCB remediation facil-
ity located around one hundred kilometers south of the U.S.–Canada 
border and hoped to offer its remediation services to clients within 
Canada.146 After Canada implemented the temporary ban, S.D. My-
ers alleged that Canada had committed several NAFTA violations 
because the ban on exporting PCBs resulted in “harm to its invest-
                                                                                                             
 142 Id. at 84. 
 143 Id. (“it is not entirely clear that Methanex reversed Metalclad.”); Metalclad 
Award, supra note 113, at para. 89 (“Metalclad was entitled to rely on the repre-
sentations of federal officials and to believe that it was entitled to continue its 
construction of the landfill.”). 
 144 Elcombe, supra note 112, at 87. 
 145 Been & Beauvais, supra note 48, at 66. 
 146 Rachel D. Edsall, Indirect Expropriation Under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: 
Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 
86 B.U. L. Rev. 931, 944 (2006). 
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ment through interference with its operations, lost contracts and op-
portunities in Canada.”147 In a similar case, Pope & Talbot v. Can-
ada, a U.S. company operating in British Columbia challenged ex-
port limitations on softwood lumber.148 Pope & Talbot alleged that 
an expropriation had occurred because the actions taken by Canada 
had “‘deprived the Investment of its ordinary ability to alienate its 
product to its traditional and natural market.’”149 “The tribunal con-
cluded that Pope & Talbot’s access to the U.S. market constituted a 
‘property interest subject to protection under Article 1110.’”150 The 
claim was unsuccessful only because the “regulatory measures im-
plemented did not ‘constitute an interference with the Investment’s 
business activities substantial enough to be characterized as an ex-
propriation under international law.’”151 
While ultimately unsuccessful, these cases indicate that under 
NAFTA, expropriation claims are given more leeway than takings 
claim under U.S. law, because denial of access to a certain market, 
or even a market share, is sufficient to form the basis of a claim.152 
Although neither the Pope & Talbot nor the S.D. My-
ers tribunals found that the claimant’s property had 
been taken, both tribunals considered the opportunity 
to sell one’s products in a particular market to be a 
property interest that could trigger the compensation 
requirement. Both awards, therefore, are inconsistent 
                                                                                                             
 147 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award, (NAFTA Trib. 2000), 40 
I.L.M. 1408 (2001) para. 290, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf. 
 148 Been & Beauvais, supra note 48, at 65. 
 149 Edsall, supra note 146, at 943. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See Terra Lawson-Remer, Values Under Siege: NAFTA, GATS, and the 
Propertization of Resources, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 481, 510 (2006) (“The tribu-
nals in both Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers asserted that market access is included 
in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership and is thus a protected property 
interest.”); Frank E. Loy, On A Collision Course? -- Two Potential Environmental 
Conflicts Between the U.S. and Canada, 28 Can.-U.S. L.J. 11, 23 (2002) (“The 
expropriation problem is compounded by the tribunals’ interpretations of certain 
terms in Chapter 11. In S.D. Myers, the Tribunal included as an “investment” 
assets such as the market share a company had achieved even though it owned no 
physical plant in the country.”). 
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with U.S. takings jurisprudence and threaten to ex-
pand the reach of regulatory takings principles to a 
wide range of investor interests not protected under 
domestic law.153 
In the similarly situated case of Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United 
States, Glamis Gold, a Canadian company, asserted that its invest-
ment had been expropriated by a series of actions taken by both the 
U.S. government and California.154 Several measures taken by both 
California and the U.S. had delayed the Glamis Gold project and 
increased its cost.155 Among those measures was one requiring “the 
complete backfilling and re-contouring of all surface hardrock min-
ing operations”; specifically, “mining operation[s] . . . within one 
mile of any Native American sacred site . . . .”156 Glamis alleged 
that the laws and regulations implemented by California “rendered 
the project economically infeasible.”157 
Glamis alleged that prior to the imposition of these requirements 
the value of its project was $49.1 million and that after the adoption 
of the measures the value shrunk to negative $8.9 million.158 In re-
sponse, the U.S. maintained “owners of mineral rights do not have 
recognized property interests in the ability to mine free from com-
pliance with subsequently enacted environmental regulation.”159 
Though the limitation on the property interests of mineral rights 
owners would likely have precluded consideration of a takings claim 
under U.S. law,160 the tribunal did not address the issue, instead dis-
posing of the expropriation claim on the grounds that Glamis did not 
suffer a large enough financial injury; in the tribunal’s analysis, the 
Project was still worth $20 million after taking into consideration 
the costs of the backfilling measure.161 
                                                                                                             
 153 Been & Beauvais, supra note 48, at 67. 
 154 See generally Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Glamis Award]. 
 155 Id. at para. 11. 
 156 Id. at para. 172. 
 157 Id. at para. 11. 
 158 Id. at para. 362. 
 159 Kahn, supra note 132, at 125. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Glamis Award, supra note 154, at para. 535-36. 
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B. Post-NAFTA Evolution of FTA Expropriation Provisions 
CAFTA-DR departs from the approach taken with NAFTA’s ex-
propriation and compensation section by providing significantly 
more guidance on interpreting the provision than NAFTA does. 
CAFTA-DR’s anti-expropriation provision provides that: 
No Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered 
investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationaliza-
tion (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public pur-
pose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on pay-
ment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 4; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
10.5.162 
While essentially replicating NAFTA’s anti-expropriation pro-
vision verbatim, albeit with a slightly altered word order, CAFTA-
DR adds Annex 10-C to guide tribunals interpreting the provision.163 
Additionally, CAFTA-DR’s expropriation and compensation sec-
tion deviates from NAFTA’s by replacing the phrase “a measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation”164 with the phrase 
“measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.”165 This 
change might appear insignificant, however, “many claims filed un-
der NAFTA’s Chapter 11 argued that ‘tantamount’ was intended to 
broaden the scope of what could be considered an indirect expropri-
ation, and it was left up to the individual tribunals to determine oth-
erwise.”166 Thus, replacing “tantamount” with “equivalent” serves 
to remove the discretion of a tribunal to apply a more expansive def-
inition of “indirect expropriation.” 
Annex 10-C, while far from a step-by-step guide, serves to re-
move some discretion from arbitral tribunals, which under NAFTA 
were free to interpret expropriation extremely broadly.167 In part, 
                                                                                                             
 162 CAFTA-DR, supra note 45, at art. 10.7(1). 
 163 See generally id, at Annex 10-C (Expropriation). 
 164 NAFTA, supra note 26, at art. 1110(1). 
 165 CAFTA-DR, supra note 45, at art. 10.7 (emphasis added). 
 166 Muse-Fisher, supra note 105, at 506. 
 167 Id. at 508 (“The CAFTA-DR removes some of the ambiguity that sur-
rounds NAFTA’s Chapter 11 by placing a ceiling on what may be considered an 
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CAFTA-DR accomplishes this by essentially codifying aspects of 
the Methanex decision. Whereas the Methanex tribunal’s analysis, 
seemingly in contravention of NAFTA’s text, stated that an action 
taken for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory, and done with 
due process was not an expropriation, Annex 10-C’s text explicitly 
provides that “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory 
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”168 
CAFTA-DR further mirrors Methanex by expressly providing that 
the expropriation provision is “intended to reflect customary inter-
national law concerning the obligation of States with respect to ex-
propriation.”169 Furthermore, CAFTA-DR provides that “actions by 
a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a 
tangible or intangible property right or property interest in an invest-
ment.”170 
Taken together, these changes reflect a serious effort to reduce 
the likelihood that investors will be compensated for having to com-
ply with government regulations: 
CAFTA-DR heavily improved upon its predecessor 
NAFTA by limiting the types of investor-state 
claims. While CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10 on Invest-
ment is nearly identical to NAFTA’s Chapter 11, it 
includes a significant addition in its Annex. Annex 
10-C addresses expropriation by further defining and 
narrowing an investor’s ability to recover due to in-
direct expropriation.171 
It is not clear how effective these changes have been in prevent-
ing investors from initiating claims in response to public interest 
regulation. Some commentators argue that “[t]hus far, redefining ex-
propriation has had a seemingly positive effect on curbing state-in-
                                                                                                             
indirect expropriation, thereby contributing to the predictability of CAFTA-DR 
for future investors.”). 
 168 CAFTA-DR, supra note 45, at Annex 10-C(4)(b). 
 169 Id. at 10-C(1). 
 170 Id. at 10-C(2). 
 171 Vincent, supra note 38, at 121. 
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vestor disputes over environmental public welfare objectives,” cit-
ing as an example Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, 
where “the claim was ultimately dismissed under the expropriation 
clause in Article 10.7.”172 In Pac Rim, however, the CAFTA-DR 
claims, including Pac Rim’s expropriation claim, were not decided 
on the merits because the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear those claims under Article 10.12 (Denial of Benefits), which 
states that: 
A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an 
investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such 
other Party and to investments of that investor if the 
enterprise has no substantial business activities in the 
territory of any Party, other than the denying Party, 
and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, 
own or control the enterprise.173 
Since its 2004 implementation, nine investor claims have been 
filed under CAFTA-DR;174 seven of which have alleged expropria-
tions.175 Peru FTA and Chile FTA include expropriation provisions 
that are essentially identical to CAFTA-DR’s expropriation provi-
sion. To date, two cases have been filed under Peru FTA, one of 
which alleges that an expropriation occurred as a result of govern-
ment environmental regulation, and one such case has been filed un-
der Chile FTA. While the twelve cases filed under CAFTA-DR, 
Peru FTA, and Chile FTA are significantly smaller than the total 
number of cases filed under NAFTA, NAFTA constitutes a signifi-
cantly larger portion of global trade than these other agreements and 
has existed longer than these other agreements. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to tell if the weaker expropriation provisions in these agree-
ments have effectively reduced the rate or success of investor claims 
against governmental regulation. 
                                                                                                             
 172 Id. at 122. 
 173 CAFTA-DR, supra note 45, at art. 10.12(2); Pac Rim Cayman, LLC v. El 
Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdic-
tional Objections, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0
935.pdf, P 4.92. 
 174 See CAFTA-DR Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c33165.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 175 See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 50. 
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The TPP’s expropriation provision incorporates many of 
CAFTA-DR’s refinements to NAFTA’s provision, which states: 
No Party shall expropriate or nationalise a covered 
investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalisa-
tion (expropriation), except: (a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in 
accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; and (d) in ac-
cordance with due process of law.176 
Like CAFTA-DR, TPP provides that the expropriation provision 
is to be interpreted in accordance with an annex that is much more 
detailed than the provision itself.177 The text of the TPP’s proposed 
Annex 9-B matches CAFTA-DR’s Annex 10-C rather closely. In 
outlining how a tribunal is to analyze if an indirect expropriation has 
occurred, CAFTA-DR and TPP use identical language: 
The determination of whether an action or series of 
actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, consti-
tutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-
case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other 
factors: (i) the economic impact of the government 
action, although the fact that an action or series of 
actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the eco-
nomic value of an investment, standing alone, does 
not establish that an indirect expropriation has oc-
curred; (ii) the extent to which the government action 
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-
backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the 
government action.178 
The only distinction between CAFTA-DR and TPP in the above 
quoted section is that TPP adds guidance on how a tribunal should 
analyze the question of whether “the government action interferes 
                                                                                                             
 176 TPP expropriation provision cite; TPP, supra note 21, at art. 9.8(1). 
 177 See TPP, supra note 21, at Annex 9-B. 
 178 CAFTA-DR, supra note 45, at Annex 10-C(4)(a); TPP Annex 9-B(3)(a) is 
identical except for the addition of a footnote. 
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with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations” by 
providing that “whether an investor’s investment-backed expecta-
tions are reasonable depends, to the extent relevant, on factors such 
as whether the government provided the investor with binding writ-
ten assurances and the nature and extent of governmental regulation 
or the potential for government regulation in the relevant sector.”179 
By providing that the reasonableness of the investor’s investment 
backed-expectations hinges on the extent of the government’s regu-
lation in the area and the potential for government regulation, TPP 
codifies one of the most important aspects of the Methanex tribu-
nal’s approach. Furthermore, TPP goes beyond Methanex by speci-
fying that only “binding written assurances” are to be considered.180 
Section III – Potential Conflict Between Environmental Provisions 
and Investor Provisions 
By departing from the approach taken by other post-2007 U.S. 
FTAs, the TPP potentially provides broader environmental protec-
tions than earlier agreements. Rather than applying to a defined list 
of seven MEAs, TPP’s MEA enforcement provisions seemingly ap-
ply more broadly to any MEA. One important example is the Paris 
Climate Agreement, although it should be noted that the Paris 
Agreement could not have been included in any earlier FTA because 
it did not exist yet.181  Though TPP does not define the term “multi-
lateral environmental agreement,”182 it appears very likely that the 
Paris Climate Agreement can be considered an MEA.183 Thus, any 
                                                                                                             
 179 TPP, supra note 21, at Ch. 9 n.36. 
 180 Id (emphasis added). 
 181 See generally Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, UNITED NATIONS 
INFORMATION PORTAL ON MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, http:/
/www.informea.org/treaties/unfccc/protocols (last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
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 183 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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2016] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 261 
 
laws and regulations implementing TPP Parties’ obligations under 
the Paris Agreement are protected by TPP in the manner discussed 
in Section I-B, above. 
Parties to the Paris Agreement submitted their own GHG emis-
sions reduction targets, and, in varying degrees of detail, explained 
how they planned to reach those targets.184 The U.S. set a target of 
reducing GHG emissions “by 26-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 
and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.”185 The 
U.S. has explained that various laws, “as well as existing and pro-
posed regulations thereunder, are relevant to the implementation of 
the U.S. target, including the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7401 et 
seq.), the Energy Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §13201 et seq.), and the En-
ergy Independence and Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 17001 et seq.).”186 
Of these, the Clean Air Act is arguably the most important for reach-
ing GHG emissions reduction targets, and specifically the Clean 
Power Plan (“CPP”) regulation promulgated pursuant to Clean Air 
Act authority.187 That is due to the fact that the CPP is the “EPA’s 
first attempt to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from existing 
power plants, the largest source of carbon emissions in the United 
States.”188 
                                                                                                             
Injecting Environmental Issues into the Multilateral Trading System, 17 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 177 (2004) (“The WTO, UNEP, and MEAs collabo-
rated to produce a background document that outlined the compliance and dispute 
resolution provisions in each of the following MEAs: the UNFCCC; the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) . . . .”). 
Additionally, the United Nations Information Portal on Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements lists the Paris Agreement as one of two protocols of the UNFCC; 
the other protocol being the Kyoto Protocol. UNFCCC, UNITED NATIONS 
INFORMATION PORTAL ON MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, 
http://www.informea.org/treaties/unfccc/protocols (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 184 See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 181. 
 185 U.S. Cover Note INDC and Accompanying Information, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www4.unfccc.int/sub-
missions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20Amer
ica/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Inform
ation.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Rachel Stevens, Will the Dark Cloud Over EPA’s Clean Power Plan Rain 
on Paris?, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL COP21/CMP11 OBSERVER DELEGATION 
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2015), http://vlscop.vermontlaw.edu/2015/11/11/will-the-dark-
cloud-over-epas-clean-power-plan-rain-on-paris/. 
 188 Id. 
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Recall that the U.S. target is a 28% reduction in emissions from 
2005 levels by 2025; the CPP “sets achievable standards to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions by 32% from 2005 levels by 2030.”189 The 
CPP is a complex regulation that divides responsibility for reducing 
GHG emissions between the Federal and State governments. The 
Federal government, through the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), is assigned the task of setting GHG emissions standards 
for affected power plants –referred to as electricity generating units 
(“EGUs”); EPA has set standards for every state other than Ver-
mont, Alaska, and Hawaii.190 The States are then left with the task 
of determining how to achieve their individual targets, and are given 
wide latitude in designing their GHG reduction approaches. The 
EPA rule provides three categories of emissions reduction measures 
that States can choose amongst, referred to as building blocks: 
Building Block 1 - reducing the carbon intensity of 
electricity generation by improving the heat rate of 
existing coal-fired power plants. 
Building Block 2 - substituting increased electricity 
generation from lower-emitting existing natural gas 
plants for reduced generation from higher-emitting 
coal-fired power plants. 
Building Block 3 - substituting increased electricity 
generation from new zero-emitting renewable energy 
                                                                                                             
 189 Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-president-
obama-announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 190 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR AND JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R 44145, EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL RULE 4, 
11 (2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44145.pdf (“a major 
change in EPA’s final rule is EPA’s establishment of uniform national CO2 emis-
sion performance rates for each of the two subcategories of electricity generating 
units— fossil-fuel-fired electric steam generating units (whether coal, oil, or nat-
ural gas) and stationary combustion turbines (natural gas combined cycle)—af-
fected by the rule. These standards are the underpinnings for the state-specific 
emission rate and mass-based targets.”). 
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sources (like wind and solar) for reduced generation 
from existing coal-fired power plants.191 
The CPP has faced heavy opposition from States and industry.192 
Dozens of States initiated suit to block the CPP shortly after the reg-
ulation was issued,193 and in an unprecedented five to four decision, 
the Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the CPP pending 
review.194 Because of the importance of the regulation and the in-
tense opposition it has faced, an analysis of a theoretical TPP inves-
tor challenge to the CPP can shed light on the interaction of TPP’s 
investor provisions and its environmental provisions, and can serve 
as a comparison between TPP and earlier FTAs. There is a signifi-
cant amount of foreign direct investment in the U.S. mining and 
electrical generation industries. As of 2013, a total of $150 billion 
of foreign investment was in the mining industry, and a further $63 
billion of foreign investment was in the electric power generation, 
                                                                                                             
 191 FACT SHEET: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 192 Megan Herzog, Clean Power Plan Litigation Kick-Off, LEGAL PLANET 
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://legal-planet.org/2015/10/28/clean-power-plan-litigation-
kick-off/. (“[T]he flood of petitions was unprecedented for an environmental reg-
ulation. E&E News confirms [paywall] that it took less than twelve hours for the 
Clean Power Plan to become the most heavily litigated environmental regulation 
of all time.”). 
 193 Id. (“West Virginia filed a petition for review of the Clean Power Plan to-
gether with 23 other states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. State petitioners argue that ‘the final rule 
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 194 Robinson Meyer, Will a Reconfigured Supreme Court Help Obama’s 
Clean-Power Plan survive?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 14 2016), http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-clean-power-plan-obama-cli-
mate-change/462807/. (“[T]he Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the [Clean Power 
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transmission, and distribution industry.195 Given the percentage of 
the world’s economy covered by TPP it seems likely that TPP mem-
ber investors will be impacted by the implementation of CPP. 
It has already been determined that CPP likely constitutes an 
“environmental law” for the purposes of TPP’s environmental pro-
visions, and thus to some extent, enforcement of CPP is mandated 
by TPP.196 Assuming that there is a suitable investor to bring the 
claim, the owner of a coal-fired power plant might have several vi-
able claims, depending on the GHG reduction approach taken by the 
State in which the plant is situated. 
If the State chooses to meet its target by requiring efficiency im-
provements in coal-fired plants, such as by mandating carbon cap-
ture and sequestration technology, an investor might make a claim 
that the cost of compliance is so high that in effect the investment in 
the coal-fired power plant has been expropriated. Such a claim 
would be very similar to that made by the investor in Glamis Gold. 
The basis of the expropriation claim in Glamis was that the new en-
vironmental remediation measures adopted by California had raised 
the cost of the Glamis project as to make it uneconomical. The tri-
bunal disposed of the expropriation claim by determining that the 
investor’s investment had not been sufficiently devalued to consti-
tute an expropriation. The costs of modifying an existing coal plant 
to meet the stringent GHG emission standard established by the CPP 
might very well be significant enough, however, to cause a tribunal 
to find that an expropriation has occurred. In 2010, “the U.S. De-
partment of Energy and the National Energy Technology Laboratory 
estimated that ‘[carbon capture and sequestration] technologies 
would add around 80% to the cost of electricity for a new pulverized 
                                                                                                             
 195 Organization for International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment in 
the United States 2014 Report, http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/FDIUS201
4.pdf. 
 196 CPP’s standing as an “environmental law” can be established through two 
separate mechanisms. As already discussed, CPP can be considered an “environ-
mental law” because it implements the U.S.’s obligations under the Paris Climate 
Agreement. CPP can also be considered an “environmental law” because its “pri-
mary purpose . . . is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a dan-
ger to human life or health . . . .” TPP, supra note 21, at art. 20.1. 
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coal plant, and around 35% to the cost of electricity for a new ad-
vanced gasification-based plant.’”197 Although such claims do not 
appear to have been brought against other EPA regulations, there is 
some indication that the EPA has at times been concerned by the 
possibility of one of their regulations triggering an expropriation 
challenge.198 Considering the pushback that CPP has received from 
States and Industry, as well as the cost of some potential compliance 
measures, CPP could conceivably face such a challenge. 
Substituting higher carbon emitting energy production for lower 
emission generation, such as by substituting coal EGUs with natural 
gas EGUs or renewable energy production, is explicitly envisioned 
by the CPP as one method for a State to reduce its carbon emissions. 
If the State chooses to meet its target by increasing the use of natural 
gas or renewable energy generation at the expense of coal, a coal 
investor might bring a claim alleging that its market share has been 
expropriated, or that it has been denied access to the market. This 
type of claim would closely mirror the claims in both S.D. Myers 
and Pope & Talbot. Although both those claims were ultimately un-
successful, as was discussed above, the tribunals in each case found 
that denial of access and market share were potentially viable 
claims. As with Glamis Gold, the Pope & Talbot tribunal found that 
the regulation at issue could have constituted an expropriation, if 
only its economic impact on the investor had been larger. 
If a tribunal to find in the investor’s favor in either case, then the 
continued enforcement of CPP would be greatly jeopardized. 
Whether or not the U.S. would continue to enforce CPP would likely 
depend on the number of investors in a position to bring similar 
claims. While such claims might well have had some teeth under 
NAFTA, it appears unlikely that they would pose much of a threat 
to regulators under TPP, because TPP’s expropriation section con-
                                                                                                             
 197 Carbon Capture Use and Storage, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/technology/factsheet/CCS. 
 198 See Gus Van Harten, Guatemala’s Peace Accords in A Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, 3 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 113, 139–40 (2000) (“According to 
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tains strong language limiting the discretion of tribunals. Specifi-
cally, TPP’s Annex 9-B specifies that “[n]on-discriminatory regula-
tory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legit-
imate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and 
the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in 
rare circumstances.”199 The CPP fits easily within this language. The 
CPP is aimed directly at reducing GHG emissions for the purposes 
of reducing the catastrophic effects of climate change on both hu-
mans and the environment in general. While it is possible that a tri-
bunal could find that CPP would constitute a “rare circumstance,” 
this seems unlikely. Furthermore, TPP’s provisions require that one 
of the components of the tribunal’s analysis must be “the extent to 
which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations,” and includes among the factors for 
determining reasonableness “the nature and extent of governmental 
regulation or the potential for government regulation in the relevant 
sector.”200 The U.S. has heavily regulated the coal industry, and all 
EGUs, for years. These regulations have covered everything from 
the mining of the coal itself, to the type of coal an EGU uses, to the 
amount of mercury an EGU can emit. Furthermore, governments 
world-wide have been moving towards strict regulation of GHG 
emissions for some time. Thus, investors cannot claim that they are 
surprised that GHG emitting industries are now starting to be regu-
lated. 
CONCLUSION 
Only time will tell what overall effect TPP will have on the en-
vironment. While there is some potential for TPP’s investor provi-
sions to negate the benefits of its environmental provisions, many 
challenges to a Party’s environmental regulation will likely be fore-
closed by TPP’s more limited expropriation section. From a proce-
dural perspective, TPP may lack an important mechanism for en-
forcing critical MEAs, but this difference between TPP and earlier 
FTAs is, in fact, smaller than it first seems because by defining en-
vironmental laws to include laws implementing a MEA, TPP’s en-
vironmental provisions incorporate any MEA rather than only the 
                                                                                                             
 199 Cite Annex 9-B quote TPP; TPP, supra note 21, at Annex 9-B. 
 200 Cite TPP footnote; TPP, supra note 21, at Ch. 9 n.36. 
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seven included in earlier FTAs. Moreover, TPP would likely create 
one significant environmental benefit; by superseding NAFTA as 
the operative FTA between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S., TPP 
would replace NAFTA’s overly vague expropriation and compen-
sation provision with a new provision that is less likely to interfere 
with governmental attempts to reduce GHG emissions. It remains to 
be seen whether this environmentally positive aspect of TPP can 
outweigh the negative environmental consequences of expanding 
free trade and, with it, investor protections to new countries. 
 
 
